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INTRODUCTION 
Where have the courts permitted the state to kick people out of their 
homes in order to build a sports stadium and expand a private university by 
taking land from existing home and business owners?  In the great state of 
New York.  In two recent decisions, the New York Court of Appeals1 
further eroded the community’s protection against eminent domain abuse 
by permitting the state to use eminent domain to take private property to 
build a stadium for the New Jersey Nets basketball team in Brooklyn,2 and 
permitting the state to take private property to expand Columbia University 
in Manhattan.3  Eminent domain is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental 
entity to take privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to 
public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.”4  Although 
eminent domain abuse is particularly rampant in New York, it is certainly 
not unique to the Empire State.5 
All over the United States, state and local governments are using 
eminent domain to force the transfer of property from one private owner to 
 
 1. The Court of Appeals is the highest state court in New York. 
 2. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 3. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 
2010). 
 4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009). 
 5. See 50 State Report Card, CASTLE COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org/about/ 
component/content/2412?task=view (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
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another.6  Although the government may claim that its taking of the 
property is for the purpose of eradicating blight, often the real purpose is to 
transfer the property to a private party that will use it in a way the 
government deems more favorable.7  The assertion that an area or property 
is blighted is merely a label that is a necessary legal prerequisite for the 
government to take the land.8  The forced taking of property from unwilling 
property owners for the purpose of transferring it to a private party who 
will make “better” economic use of the property is the essence of eminent 
domain abuse.9 
One of the purposes for which New York and other states purportedly 
use their eminent domain power is to eradicate blight.10  The statutory 
definition of blight varies from state to state and is often broad and 
imprecise.11  In general, to establish that a property is blighted, the 
condemning authority must show that it is characterized by “one or more 
factors that are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the 
community.”12  This allows states to use a variety of factors to justify 
condemning a broad range of properties in order to eradicate blight and 
improve the community.  New York courts are guided by the language in 
Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris, which states that 
many factors can constitute blight, including “irregularity of the plots, 
inadequacy of the streets, diversity of land ownership making assemblage 
of property difficult, incompatibility of the existing mixture of residential 
 
 6. Private Property Rights, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=561&Itemid=241 (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 7. See Ilya Somin, Blight Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, at 1-2, http://www.law.gmu.edu/ 
assets/homepages/isomin/files/LegalTimes_Blight.pdf (last visited Aug 27, 2010). 
 8. Carolina Journal Staff, Friday Interview: Government Misuse of the Blight Label, 
CAROLINA JOURNAL ONLINE (March 19, 2010), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/ 
display_exclusive.html?id=6200. 
 9. Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004) (“[The] ‘economic 
benefit’ rationale would validate practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on 
behalf of a private entity.  After all, if one’s ownership of private property is forever subject 
to the government’s determination that another private party would put one’s land to better 
use, then the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion plans of 
any large discount retailer, ‘megastore,’ or the like.”). 
 10. Cannata v. City of N.Y., 221 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (App. Div. 1961) (“[C]ondemnation 
is authorized, not only for slum clearance, but also to eliminate areas of ‘intangible’ physical 
blight, i.e., areas which tend to create slums or which tend to impair or arrest the sound 
growth of the city.  Such a purpose is public; redevelopment may properly be accomplished 
by private persons; and the area condemned may thereafter be properly used for 
nonresidential purposes.”). 
 11. See generally Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic 
Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (2004). 
 12. Harold L. Lowenstein, Redevelopment Condemnations: A Blight or a Blessing upon 
the Land?, 74 MO. L. REV. 301, 308 (2009). 
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and industrial property, overcrowding, the incidence of crime, lack of 
sanitation, the drain an area makes on municipal services, fire hazards, 
traffic congestion, and pollution.”13 
One of the contemporary problems of condemning properties for the 
purpose of eradicating blight is that some states consider certain purely 
economic conditions to be factors that can be used to determine that an area 
is blighted.14  Some examples of these economic factors are stagnant 
property values, high business vacancy rates, and an excess of liquor stores 
or adult-oriented businesses.15  One of the more controversial economic 
factors commonly used to determine blight is economic underutilization.16 
In 2009, two different New York state courts that considered 
condemnation actions based on blighted properties came to two markedly 
different conclusions.17  In Goldstein v. New York State Urban 
Development Corp., the New York Court of Appeals stated that “economic 
 
 13. 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975). 
 14. In California, for example, the following economic conditions are considered to 
cause blight: 
(1) Depreciated or stagnant property values. 
(2) Impaired property values, due in significant part, to hazardous wastes on 
property where the agency may be eligible to use its authority as specified in 
Article 12.5 (commencing with Section 33459). 
(3) Abnormally high business vacancies, abnormally low lease rates, or an 
abnormally high number of abandoned buildings. 
(4) A serious lack of necessary commercial facilities that are normally found in 
neighborhoods, including grocery stores, drug stores, and banks and other lending 
institutions. 
(5) Serious residential overcrowding that has resulted in significant public health 
or safety problems.  As used in this paragraph, “overcrowding” means exceeding 
the standard referenced in Article 5 (commencing with Section 32) of Chapter 1 of 
Title 25 of the California Code of Regulations. 
(6) An excess of bars, liquor stores, or adult-oriented businesses that has resulted 
in significant public health, safety, or welfare problems. 
(7) A high crime rate that constitutes a serious threat to the public safety and 
welfare. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031(b) (West 2008). 
 15. Id. § 33031(b)(1), (3), (6). 
 16. Compare Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009), 
and Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth., 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1987) (using 
economic underutilization of land as a proper basis for condemnation by city), with Kaur v. 
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, No. 125, 2010 N.Y. 
LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010), and Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 
924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007) (finding a statute that allowed redevelopment of stagnant land did 
not give the borough authority to redevelop land simply because it was unproductive). 
 17. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (considering whether it was permissible to condemn land 
in Brooklyn to build a stadium); Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (considering whether it was 
permissible to condemn land in Manhattanville in order to expand Columbia University). 
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underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to 
make their removal cognizable as a public purpose.”18  Nine days later, in 
Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., the Appellate Division, 
First Department, called for an end to “eminent domain takings solely 
based on underutilization.”19  Seeking reversal of the Appellate Division’s 
decision in light of the recent Goldstein decision, the Empire State 
Development Corporation (ESDC)20 appealed the Kaur decision to the 
New York Court of Appeals.21  Although the Kaur decision was promptly 
overturned,22 the stark contrast between the views of the Court of Appeals 
and the Appellate Division highlights the ongoing controversy over 
eminent domain abuse in New York.23  Despite having the perfect 
opportunity to set limits on the extent to which economic factors may 
provide the basis for blight determinations, the Court of Appeals flatly 
dismissed the Appellate Division’s arguments because they were 
“unsupported by the record.”24  By avoiding the issue of allowing 
 
 18. 921 N.E.2d at 172 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 19. 892 N.Y.S.2d at 23.  The alternative justification that the Empire State Development 
Corporation asserted for the condemnation was that the project qualified as a “civic project” 
pursuant to the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act (“UDCA” or “UDC 
Act”). Id.  The Appellate Division rejected this argument as well, stating that “a private 
university does not constitute facilities for a ‘civic project’” within the definition of the 
UDCA. Id. 
 20. The ESDC is the New York State agency that condemned the Manhattanville 
property. 
 21. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 
2010). 
 22. The New York Court of Appeals found that that the project qualified as both a “land 
use improvement project” and as a “civic project” within the meaning of the UDCA. Id. at 
*38-39.  Because the requirement that the land in question be blighted applies primarily to 
land use improvement projects, this Note does not address civic projects. Compare N.Y. 
UNCONSOL. LAW § 6253 (6)(c) (McKinney 2009) (defining “[l]and use improvement 
project” as an “undertaking for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation . 
. . of a substandard and insanitary area”), with id. § 6253(6)(d) (defining “[c]ivic project” 
without any reference to the condition of the land).  In order to qualify as a civic project, the 
Court must find that there is a “civic purpose.” See id.  Although the condemning authority 
must still satisfy the “public use” clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions 
when asserting that a project is a “civic project,” that public use may be any public use, not 
necessarily the removal of blight. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *40 (Smith, J., 
concurring) (noting that “if [the court] did reject the blight rationale, [it] would have to 
consider whether this taking can be characterized as being for ‘public use’ on some other 
ground”).  In his concurring opinion, Judge Smith correctly stated that “[o]nce [the court 
has] decided that the removal of urban blight provides a sufficient constitutional basis for 
the taking, and that the project is a ‘land use improvement project’ within the meaning of 
the UDC Act, there is no reason to consider [the] UDC’s alternative argument that the 
taking may also be justified as one for a ‘civic project.’” Id. at *39 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 23. Compare Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, with Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181. 
 24. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *27. 
PIPER_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:56 PM 
1154 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
economic underutilization alone to render a property blighted,25 the Court 
of Appeals failed to address a controversy that has led to the introduction of 
eminent domain reform in the New York legislature.26 
Part I of this Note describes the background of eminent domain and, in 
particular, the elimination of blight as a qualifying public use.  It 
summarizes the history of the “public use” requirement in the federal and 
state context and how economic underutilization fits into the analysis.  Part 
II examines the problem of permitting economic underutilization to be used 
as evidence in determining whether an area is blighted, as well as the role 
that economic underutilization played in the outcome of Kaur.  Part III 
argues that New York needs to limit the extent to which a blight 
determination can be based on economic underutilization.  It contends that 
the legislature should address Kaur and the issue of economic 
underutilization by restricting the statutory definition of blight. 
I.  BLIGHT CONDEMNATIONS 
A. “Public Use” Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution 
According to the Fifth Amendment, there are two limits on the federal 
government’s power to take land: first, the taking must be for a “public 
use,” and second, “just compensation” must be paid.27  At the outset, public 
use was interpreted to mean that the government could only take private 
property when the project would directly benefit the public.28  However, 
public use is an evolving concept that has changed with the times, and now 
is often interpreted to mean “public purpose.”29  In 1916, in Mount Vernon-
Woodbury Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., the United 
States Supreme Court permitted Alabama to use eminent domain to 
manufacture, supply, and sell energy to the public.30  The Court found that 
providing energy qualified as a public purpose and rejected the “use by the 
general public” test as it applied to state takings.31  In a series of later 
decisions, the Court rejected a narrow interpretation of public use and 
 
 25. See id. at *20-24. 
 26. See S.B. 6791 and A.B. 10811, 2010 Leg., 233rd Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2010) (defining 
blighted properties and areas). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 28. See, e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (1837). 
 29. William Woodyard & Glenn Boggs, Public Outcry: Kelo v. City of New London—A 
Proposed Solution, 39 ENVT. L. 431, 444 (2009). 
 30. 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916). 
 31. Id. 
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instead adopted a broad interpretation that permitted almost any 
condemnation project that benefitted the public in some way to qualify.32 
The Court embraced a broad view of public use in Berman v. Parker and 
allowed eminent domain to be used to redevelop property in order to 
remove blight.33  The Court specifically found that the removal of blight 
qualified as a public use.34  Additionally, the Court embraced the concept 
of urban renewal as a public use.35  It emphasized the importance of not 
only eliminating slums, but also preventing them from being created in the 
future.36  This signaled a departure from earlier cases where condemnation 
was exercised as a response to an area that was already considered a 
slum.37 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court upheld 
Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967, which provided for the taking and 
transfer of title and real property from lessors to lessees for the purpose of 
reducing the concentration of land ownership.38  The Court stated that it 
was not necessary for the entire community, or even a considerable portion 
of the community, to benefit from an improvement in order for it to 
constitute a public use.39  Similarly, in 2005, the Court held that an 
economic development plan that used eminent domain to transfer land that 
was not blighted to private redevelopers satisfied the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.40 
 
 32. In Berman v. Parker, “public use” was interpreted to mean “public purpose.” 348 
U.S. 26, 33 (1954).  Subsequently, as long as the public benefitted from the project in some 
tangible way, it would survive constitutional scrutiny as to public use. See, e.g., Kelo v. City 
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-81 (2005). 
 33. 348 U.S. at 33-36. 
 34. Id. at 35.  In Berman, the owner of a department store contested a finding that the 
property was included in an area that was blighted. Id. at 34.  The Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress and its authorized agencies have the power to redevelop an area as a whole in 
order to prevent future slums from developing. Id. at 35.  The Court stated, “the standards 
prescribed were adequate for executing the plan to eliminate not only slums as narrowly 
defined by the District Court but also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums.” Id. 
 35. See id. at 34-35. 
 36. Id. at 35 (“In this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be 
controlled and the birth of future slums prevented.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 104 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 1954) 
(“[T]here can be no doubt that the elimination of such substandard, insanitary, deteriorated, 
slum or blighted areas as are described therein and in the portions of the statute which 
authorize condemnation is for the public welfare.”). 
 38. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 244 (quoting Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)). 
 40. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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B. “Public Use” in New York 
1. The Evolution of “Public Use” 
The New York Constitution provides some of the framework for New 
York’s eminent domain powers.41  Article XVIII, section 1 provides the 
state legislature with the power to clear areas that are “substandard and 
insanitary.”42  Article XVIII, section 2 gives the legislature permission to 
“grant the power of eminent domain to any city, town or village, to any 
public corporation and to any corporation regulated by law as to rents, 
profits, dividends and disposition of its property or franchises and engaged 
in providing housing facilities.”43  Article XVIII, section 6 prohibits the 
state from funding a project “unless such project is in conformity with a 
plan or undertaking for the clearance, replanning and reconstruction or 
rehabilitation of a sub-standard and unsanitary area or areas and for 
recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto.”44 
At first, New York addressed unfavorable eminent domain decisions by 
the courts by amending the State Constitution.45  For example, in 1843, the 
court in Taylor v. Porter struck down a statute permitting owners of 
landlocked parcels to condemn part of a neighbor’s property in order to 
construct a road that reached a public street.46  In response, lawmakers 
amended the New York Constitution to authorize a private owner to 
condemn property for the purpose of constructing private roads.47  In 1894, 
the legislature again amended New York’s Constitution to allow the use of 
eminent domain on behalf of agricultural property owners.48  Subsequently, 
the state used its eminent domain powers to allow farmers to construct 
drains and ditches on neighboring properties for drainage purposes.49  
 
 41. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII. 
 42. Id. § 1 (“Subject to the provisions of this article, the legislature may provide in such 
manner, by such means and upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe for low rent 
housing and nursing home accommodations for persons of low income as defined by law, or 
for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary 
areas, or for both such purposes, and for recreational and other facilities incidental or 
appurtenant thereto.”). 
 43. Id. § 2. 
 44. Id. § 6. 
 45. INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, BUILDING EMPIRES, DESTROYING HOMES: EMINENT DOMAIN 
ABUSE IN NEW YORK 2 (2009) [hereinafter BUILDING EMPIRES, DESTROYING HOMES]. 
 46. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
 47. Eric Kades, The End of the Hudson Valley’s Peculiar Institution: The Anti-Rent 
Movement’s Politics, Social Relations, and Economics, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 954 
(2002). 
 48. BUILDING EMPIRES, DESTROYING HOMES, supra note 45. 
 49. Id. 
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Eventually, the method through which the government expanded its 
eminent domain power shifted from amending the New York Constitution 
to facilitating change through common law developments in the state 
courts.50  The state courts began to interpret “public use” broadly to 
facilitate the expansion of state eminent domain powers.51  The courts also 
started to construe “blight” liberally to cover a broad range of physical 
conditions.52 
New York passed the first “urban renewal” legislation in the United 
States in 1941,53 more than a decade before Berman was decided.54  Today, 
many states’ statutory language defining blight is flexible enough to cover 
a variety of situations.55  However, New York does not currently have a 
codified definition of blight to guide state agencies and judges, so courts 
rely on the language from Yonkers56 to guide their determination of blight 
under the New York Constitution Article XVIII §1.57 
2. Relevant New York Eminent Domain Statutory Law 
New York also has statutory law that governs its eminent domain 
powers.  Section 74 of the New York General Municipal Law grants a 
municipal corporation the power of condemnation.58  Section 502 of the 
New York General Municipal Law defines a “substandard or insanitary 
area” as “interchangeable with a slum, blighted, deteriorated or 
deteriorating area, or an area which has a blighting influence on the 
surrounding area.”59  New York State delegates its authority to condemn 
private property for public use to a governmental or quasi-governmental 
agency, such as a municipality, public service commission or a quasi-
 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (N.Y. 1975). 
 53.  The New York statute authorized the creation of local organizations with the 
authority to condemn and clear blighted areas in order for them to be developed privately. 
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses 
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 32 (2003). 
 54. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also supra notes 33-37 and 
accompanying text. 
 55. See Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 302. 
 56. The interrelationships of many factors may be significant in the determination of 
whether blight exists. Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 332. 
 57. See, e.g., Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at 
*12 (June 24, 2010); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 188 (N.Y. 
2009). 
 58. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 74 (McKinney 2007). 
 59. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502 (McKinney 1999). 
PIPER_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:56 PM 
1158 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
public corporation.60  In both Goldstein and Kaur, the condemning 
authority was the ESDC.61 
Before condemning a property for purposes of blight removal, a blight 
study is usually conducted.62  The condemning authority usually contracts 
with a private consultant to conduct this blight study.63  The study 
examines the conditions of the property or area that is to be condemned in 
order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the 
property or area is blighted.64  For example, the 2006 Atlantic Yards Arena 
and Redevelopment Project Blight Study, the controversial study in 
Goldstein,65 found that the “22-acre area proposed for the Atlantic Yards 
Arena and Redevelopment Project (‘project site’) [was] characterized by 
blighted conditions that [were] unlikely to be removed without public 
action.”66  Such studies are used as evidence to support the government’s 
assertion that an area or property is blighted.67 
In terms of procedural law, section 201 of the New York Eminent 
Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) provides that condemnation hearings be 
held to “inform the public and to review the public use to be served.”68  
 
 60. In re Inwood Hill Park, 219 A.D. 478, 483-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927) (“The State 
may delegate the power to take such land to its agent, the municipality.”); see also IRVING L. 
LEVEY & JACOB S. MANHEIMER, CONDEMNATION IN NEW YORK 12 (1937). 
 61. The ESDC, formally known as the Urban Development Corporation “oversees 
important development projects, aimed at fostering sustainable growth, creating jobs, 
reviving our economy and expanding opportunities for all New Yorkers.” Major 
Development Projects, NEW YORK STATE’S EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT, http://esd.ny.gov/ 
Subsidiaries_Projects.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). 
 62. See Tuck-It-Away Assocs. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (App. 
Div. 2008) (noting that a blight study is usually performed in order to provide support that 
the area is “substandard and insanitary”). 
 63. In both Goldstein and Kaur, the blight studies were prepared by Allee, King, Rosen 
and Fleming, Inc. (AKRF). Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 189 
(N.Y. 2009); Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13 (App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010).  The ESDC later hired another 
consultant, Earth Tech, Inc., to review AKRF’s blight study in Kaur. Kaur v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *12 (June 24, 2010). 
 64. See generally Robert H. Freilich & Robin A. Kramer, Condemnation for Economic 
Development Violates Public Use Clause: The Michigan Supreme Court Overturns Historic 
Poletown Decision, SL005 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 217, 223-24 (2005) (providing an overview of the 
difficulties associated with conducting blight studies). 
 65. 921 N.E.2d at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“Choosing their words carefully, the 
consultants concluded that the area of the proposed Atlantic Yards development, taken as a 
whole, was ‘characterized by blighted conditions.’  They did not find, and it does not appear 
they could find, that the area where the petitioners live is a blighted area . . . .”). 
 66. See AKRF, INC., ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT BLIGHT 
STUDY i (July 2006). 
 67. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 173. 
 68. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. § 201 (McKinney 2002). 
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These hearings allow relevant parties to discuss the project and alert the 
condemning party to factors that may make the project more costly than 
projected.69  The condemning authority must publish a determination and 
findings70 within ninety days of the hearing.71  Section 204(c) of the EDPL 
requires that anyone opposing the condemnation must bring an action 
directly to the Appellate Division within thirty days after the hearings are 
held.72  New York is unique in this respect because most other states allow 
affected property owners to file suit at the time the government actually 
moves to take the property.73  Often, the government will not move to 
condemn the property for months or even years after the determination has 
been made, which gives property owners in states without a thirty day 
statute of limitations a much longer timeframe to file a lawsuit.74  The 
statute of limitations for bringing a federal § 1983 claim is three years,75 
beginning when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know” of the injury 
that is the basis of the action.76  This language has been interpreted to mean 
that a plaintiff is deemed to have knowledge when the condemning 
authority announces its public purpose finding.77 
Section 207(c) of the EDPL limits the Appellate Division’s review to 
whether:  
(1) the proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state 
constitutions, (2) the proposed acquisition is within the condemnor’s 
statutory jurisdiction or authority, (3) the condemnor’s determination and 
findings were made in accordance with procedures set forth in this article 
and with article eight of the environmental conservation law, and (4) a 
public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed 
acquisition.78 
 
 69. Jon M. Santemma & Andrew M. Mahony, The Acquisition of Property in Non-State 
Takings, in CONDEMNATION LAW AND PROCEDURES IN NEW YORK 29, 33 (Jon Santemma 
ed., 2005). 
 70. Section 204(b) of the EDPL states that determinations and findings must specify: (1) 
the public use, benefit or purpose to be served by the proposed public project; (2) the 
approximate location for the proposed public project and the reasons for selection of that 
location; (3) the general effect of the proposed project on the environment and residents of 
the locality; (4) such other factors as it considers relevant. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. § 204(b) 
(McKinney 2005). 
 71. Santemma & Mahony, supra note 69. 
 72. EM. DOM. PROC. § 204(c). 
 73. BUILDING EMPIRES, DESTROYING HOMES, supra note 45, at 4. 
 74. See id. 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (providing a federal cause of action for the violation of 
constitutional rights). 
 76. Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 77. Didden v. Vill. of Port Chester, 173 F. App’x 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 78. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. § 207(c) (McKinney 2002). 
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Since it is an appellate court, its review is limited to the record from the 
public hearings.79  As a result, the Appellate Division cannot review any 
issue that was not raised during the hearings.80  This is troublesome 
because the public hearings permit property owners to present evidence but 
do not allow them to cross-examine witnesses or ask questions.81  Because 
these proceedings are not adversarial, questions about potential due process 
violations have been raised regarding the procedural mechanism provided 
by the state.82 
The scope of judicial review of a proposed condemnation in New York 
is limited to “whether the procedural requirements of EDPL article 2 were 
met and, with respect to the substantive determinations and findings, 
whether there exists a rational factual basis.”83  Early court decisions in 
New York emphasized that the question of whether there is a “public use” 
is a judicial question that must be determined by the courts.84  Since 
removal of blight is a public purpose, one would assume that courts 
regularly scrutinize whether an area is blighted.  In reality, however, New 
York courts affirm most state agency decisions regarding whether a 
property or area is blighted as long as there is some evidence, regardless of 
how insubstantial, supporting blight.85 
C. Removal of Blight as a “Public Use” 
In Kaskel v. Impellitteri, the New York Court of Appeals weighed in on 
the government’s determination that an area adjacent to Columbus Circle in 
Manhattan was subject to condemnation for the purpose of slum 
clearance.86  In upholding the condemnation, the Court of Appeals stated 
that courts should not overturn an agency finding of blight as long as the 
finding was not made “corruptly or irrationally or baselessly.”87  The logic 
behind this decision was that determining whether a property is blighted is 
a legislative function, and the power to make that determination is vested in 
the state agencies.88  In turn, the court may only review agencies’ findings 
 
 79. BUILDING EMPIRES, DESTROYING HOMES, supra note 45, at 4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Greenwich Assocs. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 152 A.D.2d 216, 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1989). 
 84. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Steward, 63 N.E. 118, 119 (N.Y. 1902); Pocantico Water 
Works Co. v. Bird, 29 N.E. 246, 258 (N.Y. 1891). 
 85. BUILDING EMPIRES, DESTROYING HOMES, supra note 45. 
 86. 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953). 
 87. Id. at 661. 
 88. See Yonkers Cmty Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975). 
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on a limited basis.89  In fact, if a government agency finds a public purpose, 
that finding is “well-nigh conclusive,” and as long as the exercise of 
eminent domain is rationally related to this “conceivable” public purpose, 
the taking will be upheld.90  In Goldstein, the New York Court of Appeals 
emphasized that “[i]t is only where there is no room for reasonable 
difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that judges may 
substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of 
blight removal has been made out for those of the legislatively designated 
agencies . . . .”91  Courts deferring to legislative determinations of whether 
the “public use” requirement has been satisfied, despite the fact that it is a 
judicial function, is a source of tension in eminent domain challenges. 
Although several states have made legislative changes to prevent it, 
many states still permit blight condemnations based on economic 
underutilization.92  In upholding the condemnation of the Atlantic Yards 
properties in Goldstein, the Court of Appeals recognized that “economic 
underdevelopment and stagnation” were threats to the public that justified 
their removal as a “public purpose.”93  This decision was not surprising 
given the New York Court of Appeals’ general reluctance to invalidate 
eminent domain condemnations.94  However, in Kaur—handed down nine 
days later—the Appellate Division called for an end to blight findings 
based on economic underutilization, indicating that there should be a limit 
to the legislature’s discretion on blight determinations.95  Significantly, the 
language used by the Appellate Division in Kaur rejected the precedential 
line of cases in New York supporting blight determinations based on 
economic factors,96 and accordingly was subsequently overturned by the 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 441 (N.Y. 1986) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 91. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009).  The 
court went on to explain that “[t]he Constitution accords government broad power to take 
and clear substandard and insanitary areas for redevelopment. In so doing, it 
commensurately deprives the Judiciary of grounds to interfere with the exercise.” Id. at 173. 
 92. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (analyzing state reactions to the Supreme Court’s 
Kelo decision in 2005). 
 93. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172. 
 94. See, e.g., Jackson, 494 N.E.2d 429; Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d 327; Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 
115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953). 
 95. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 23 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 
No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 96. See, e.g., Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164; Jackson, 494 N.E.2d 429; Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d 
327; Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d 659. 
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Court of Appeals.97  The conflict between the views of the Court of 
Appeals and the Appellate Division on the issue of blight determinations 
provides insight into the controversy regarding New York’s eminent 
domain powers.98 
II.  ECONOMIC UNDERUTILIZATION’S RELATIONSHIP TO BLIGHT 
This section will discuss the different opinions on what branch of 
government is responsible for deciding whether the Fifth Amendment’s 
“public use” requirement is satisfied.  It will examine the debate over the 
use of economic underutilization as a factor in determining whether a 
property is blighted, including a discussion of some of the public policy 
problems associated with blight determinations based on economic factors.  
Finally, it explores the starkly different ways that the New York Court of 
Appeals and Appellate Division have treated economic underutilization as 
a factor to determine blight.99 
A. Who Determines Whether There is a “Public Use”? 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
private property may not be taken for public use unless just compensation 
is paid.100  This is sometimes interpreted to mean that federal and state 
governments may only take private property if it is for a “public use.”101  
However, there is much debate regarding whether certain projects satisfy 
the public use requirement and who should determine whether a project has 
a public use. 
1. United States Supreme Court: Leave it to the Legislature! 
The United States Supreme Court has expressed the view that the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is responsible for determining whether a 
project has a public use.102  In Berman the Court announced that “[i]n such 
cases, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public 
 
 97. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 
2010). 
 98. Compare id., with Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d 8. 
 99. Compare Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 164, and Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *1, 
with Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 8. 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 101. The Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement is applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 102. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
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needs to be served by social legislation.”103  The Court deferred to the 
legislative determination that there was a public purpose because, “when 
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive.”104  This established a policy of limiting the role of 
the judiciary in deciding whether an area was blighted.  The Berman 
decision was not surprising given the general reluctance of the Supreme 
Court to invalidate federal or state condemnations over the years.105  
Although the Supreme Court emphasized that private property could not be 
condemned and transferred to another private person even under legislative 
mandate, its broad reading of the Fifth Amendment lent support to urban 
renewal advocates and paved the way for redevelopment authorities to 
exercise their power in any way they saw fit so long as it was somewhat 
related to a public use.106 
In allowing a department store that was indisputably not blighted to be 
included in a community redevelopment project, the Court emphasized in 
Berman that community redevelopment programs do not have to be 
implemented on a piecemeal basis.107  This allowed the Court to look at the 
overall condition of all of the property proposed to be condemned for 
redevelopment purposes as a whole, instead of determining if each 
individually owned property was itself blighted.108  The decision relieved 
some of the burden from redevelopment agencies to prove blight and 
opened the door to urban renewal projects all over the country.109 
In Midkiff, the Supreme Court ruled that eminent domain was a police 
power of the state.110  Therefore, “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus 
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers,” and the Court 
has a limited role in reviewing a legislative judgment of what constitutes a 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. In 1896, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a state act that required the 
Missouri Pacific Railroad to allow farmers to construct grain elevators on its property.  The 
rationale behind this was that, because the grain elevators were used by the farmers and not 
the general public, the act was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).  In 1923, the Supreme Court 
noted that while determining whether a use is public or private is a judicial question, the 
Court should give “great respect” to the judgment of state courts in determining whether it is 
a public use. Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 705-06 (1923). 
 106. Pritchett, supra note 53, at 12. 
 107. 348 U.S. at 35. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Urban renewal is defined as “[t]he process of redeveloping urban areas by 
demolishing or repairing existing structures or by building new facilities on areas that have 
been cleared in accordance with an overall plan.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1680 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 110. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984). 
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public use.111  In Kelo, the Supreme Court ruled that although there was no 
evidence of physical blight, New London’s finding that the area was 
“sufficiently distressed” to justify a program of economic revival required 
the Court’s deference.112  Clearly, the Supreme Court has tried to avoid 
ruling on the merits of a legislative decision when it is not necessary. 
2. New York Courts: We Will Not Interfere! 
In general, state courts are more likely to view public use as a judicial 
question than federal courts.113  In 1891, the New York Court of Appeals in 
Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, emphasized the fact that “[t]he 
question of public use is a judicial one and must be determined by the 
courts.”114  In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals in Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Steward, stated that “[t]he courts are to decide whether the uses, for 
which the land is demanded, are, in fact, public and within the intendment 
of the statute.”115  However, judicial interpretation of whether the project in 
question had a public use, as exemplified by Pocantino and Erie, 
eventually fell out of favor.  New York courts transitioned from treating the 
interpretation of public use as a judicial exercise to being highly deferential 
to the legislature’s decision of whether the project had a public use.116  In 
Kaskel, the New York Court of Appeals refused to overturn a legislative 
body’s finding that an area was “substandard and insanitary” as long as it 
was not made “corruptly or irrationally or baselessly.”117  The court went 
as far as to say that the city officials’ decision was “simply an act of 
government, that is, an exercise of governmental power, legislative in 
fundamental character, which, whether wise or unwise, cannot be 
overhauled by the courts.”118  Such deference to legislative decisions has 
stripped the courts of most of their power to determine whether there was a 
public use to justify the use of eminent domain.  Twenty-two years later in 
Yonkers, the New York Court of Appeals confirmed that the agencies and 
 
 111. Id. at 240. 
 112. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005). 
 113. James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is The Glass Half Full Or Half Empty?, 17 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 146 (2009). 
 114. 29 N.E. 246, 248 (N.Y. 1891). 
 115. 63 N.E. 118, 119 (N.Y. 1902). 
 116. The shift of the New York Court of Appeals’ view on the amount of judicial 
deference owed to the legislature can be seen by contrasting Pocantico, 29 N.E. 246, with 
Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953). 
 117. 115 N.E.2d at 661. 
 118. Id. at 662. 
PIPER_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:56 PM 
2010] NEW YORK’S FIGHT OVER BLIGHT 1165 
municipalities had “extensive authority” to make the determination of 
whether an area is blighted.119 
More recently, in Goldstein, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its 
deference to legislative determinations regarding the application of the 
government’s power to take “substandard and insanitary” areas.120  The 
court stated that “[i]t is only where there is no room for reasonable 
difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that judges may 
substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of 
blight removal has been made out for those of the legislatively designated 
agencies . . . .”121  In upholding the condemnation, the court noted that 
there was only evidence of a “reasonable difference of opinion” regarding 
whether the properties to be condemned in Brooklyn were “substandard 
and insanitary.”122  This “reasonable difference of opinion” between the 
ESDC and petitioners was not substantial enough for the court to overturn 
the ESDC’s findings.123  New York courts generally do not involve 
themselves in deciding whether an area is blighted unless it is absolutely 
clear that the state agency or municipality has erred in its determination. 
Not surprisingly, the degree of deference courts give to the legislature 
has been highly criticized.124  The dissent in Kaskel emphasized that the 
question of public use is a judicial question.125  While discussing the 
deference that should be given to the decision of the legislature, the 
Yonkers opinion emphasized that courts are required to be “more than 
rubber stamps in the determination of the existence of substandard 
conditions in urban renewal condemnation cases.”126  In Goldstein, the 
New York Court of Appeals admitted that it was possible that the bar has 
been set too low and perhaps blight should not be defined by studies that 
are paid for by the developers themselves.127  In his dissent in Goldstein, 
Justice Smith argued that “[t]o let the agency itself determine when the 
public use requirement is satisfied is to make the agency a judge in its own 
cause.”128  His view aligns with other commentators who believe the 
 
 119. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975). 
 120. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 121. Id. at 172. 
 122. Id. at 173. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting); Kaskel v. Impelliterri, 
115 N.E.2d 669, 669-70 (N.Y. 1953) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). 
 125. Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 665 (Van Voohris, J., dissenting). 
 126. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975); see also 
infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. 
 127. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 164. 
 128. Id. at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
PIPER_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:56 PM 
1166 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
judiciary gives too much deference to the legislative agency’s 
determination of whether a “public use” exists.129 
B. Economic Underutilization in the Eminent Domain Context 
Economic underutilization, as it refers to property, is the concept that 
land or property has the potential to be put to a better or more efficient 
use.130  Some examples of factors that reflect economic underutilization 
include a high number of tax delinquencies, tax delinquencies that are 
greater than the value of the land, and a high number of defective titles, 
which hinder the transferability of the property.131  A finding that a 
property is blighted because of economic underutilization is tantamount to 
taking land for the purpose of economic development.132  Instead of saying 
that the condemned land could be put to a better use in a straightforward 
manner, a state agency might say that because the condemned land is not 
being put to the best or most efficient use possible, it is blighted and 
therefore subject to condemnation for urban renewal purposes. 
1. Economic Underutilization as a Factor Used to Determine Blight 
a. Federal Courts 
One of the major United States Supreme Court cases that supports the 
use of economic underutilization as a factor to determine blight is 
Berman.133  The owner of a department store that was not physically 
blighted argued that his store could not be included in the area to be 
 
 129. See, e.g., Dick M. Carpenter & John K. Ross, Robin Hood in Reverse, CITY J., Jan. 
15, 2010, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/eon0115dcjr.html. 
 130. In her dissent in Kelo, Justice O’Connor highlighted the problem with takings based 
on economic factors: 
In the prescient words of a dissenter from the infamous decision in Poletown, 
“[n]ow that we have authorized local legislative bodies to decide that a different 
commercial or industrial use of property will produce greater public benefits than 
its present use, no homeowner’s, merchant’s or manufacturer’s property, however 
productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation for the benefit 
of other private interests that will put it to a ‘higher’ use.” 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504-05 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981)). 
 131. Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Coping With Kelo: A Potpourri of Legislative 
and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 799, 813 (2008). 
 132. See Timothy Neidbalski, Comment, Imminent Change: A Recommended Response 
For Missouri in the Wake of the Supreme Court, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 449, 478 
(2006). 
 133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also supra notes 102-08 and 
accompanying text. 
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redeveloped because it was not blighted like other properties.134  The Court 
disagreed and allowed the department store to be included in the 
condemned area.135  The Court stated that “[i]t is within the power of the 
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully 
patrolled.”136  This opened the door for the government to take property for 
redevelopment “which, standing by itself, is innocuous and 
unoffending.”137  The Court reasoned that if the government had a 
redevelopment plan, it did not have to be implemented on a piecemeal, lot-
by-lot basis.138  Rather, the condition of the area as a whole was to be 
considered when deciding whether the exercise of eminent domain was 
constitutional.139 
b. New York Courts 
In Kaskel, the New York Court of Appeals began to depart from the 
traditional view that there needed to be actual slum conditions to justify the 
removal of urban blight.140  The court pointed out that although the area in 
question was not like the slums described in “[Charles] Dickens’ novels,” 
the record nonetheless showed that the area was “substandard and 
insanitary by modern tests.”141  The court found that the buildings were 
below modern standards because of age, obsolescence, and decay.142  
These conditions supported the legislative agency’s determination that the 
Columbus Circle area was blighted.143  These conclusions were met with a 
strong dissent from Judge Van Voorhis.144 
The New York Court of Appeals supported economic underutilization as 
a factor for determining blight in Yonkers.145  The court stated that, “among 
other things, economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to 
the public sufficient to make their removal cognizable as a public 
 
 134. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34. 
 135. Id. at 33. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 35. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953). 
 141. Id. at 661. 
 142. Id. at 662. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 663 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 190-94 and 
accompanying text. 
 145. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975). 
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purpose.”146  It even went as far as saying that “improper land use” is 
evidence that supports the finding that an area is blighted.147  This hinted 
that the court was open to considering economic concerns, such as whether 
the land is being put to its “best” use possible, when considering whether it 
is blighted.  Additionally, the court noted that the factors that determine 
blight did not have to be precise since the “combination and effects of such 
things are highly variable.”148  For an area to be termed blighted and thus 
subject to urban renewal condemnation, it is not necessary for the “degree 
of deterioration or precise percentage of obsolescence or mathematical 
measurement of other factors be arrived at with precision, since the 
combination and effects of such things are highly variable.”149 
More recently, in Goldstein, the ESDC issued a determination that it 
would be using its eminent domain power to take privately owned 
residential and commercial properties in Brooklyn and turn them over to a 
private redeveloper, Forest City Ratner Companies (FCRC).150  The area to 
be condemned included the Vanderbilt rail and Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (MTA) bus yards (known as “Atlantic Yards”), and certain 
blocks to the south.151  The project is slated to include the construction of a 
stadium for the National Basketball Association’s Nets franchise, a 
modernized Vanderbilt rail and MTA subway hub, and several high-rise 
buildings of mixed commercial and residential use.152  The project was 
characterized by the ESDC as a “land use improvement project” for the 
purpose of eliminating blight.153 
The New York Court of Appeals was given the task of determining 
whether the ESDC violated the New York State Constitution by using its 
eminent domain power to acquire petitioners’ properties, which had not 
been previously declared blighted.154  In upholding the condemnation, the 
court recognized that it was possible to differ from the ESDC’s findings, 
but in light of the photographic evidence, the difference did not amount to 
more than “another reasonable view of the matter.”155  The court reasoned 
 
 146. Id. at 330. 
 147. Id. at 332. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Bruce Ratner is a private developer who is the principal of Forest City Ratner 
Companies. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y. 2009). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  Approximately one-third of the residential dwelling units in the high-rise 
buildings will be reserved for low and/or middle income families. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 165. 
 155. Id. 
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that similarly to Kaskel,156 there was only a reasonable difference in 
opinion of whether the area in question was “substandard and 
insanitary.”157  The court refused to interfere with the ESDC’s decision that 
the property was blighted unless it was “irrational and baseless to call it 
substandard or insanitary.”158 
The Court of Appeals emphasized that evidence of blight was not 
required to be as severe as the conditions of the slums during the Great 
Depression.159  It went on to say that areas eligible for redevelopment were 
not limited to traditional “slums,” but could also encompass other threats to 
the public such as “economic underdevelopment and stagnation.”160  
Although this does not go as far as embracing economic development as a 
public purpose in itself, it provides strong support for blight findings based 
on economic underutilization.  It also permits agencies to condemn 
property whenever the legislature decides that the economic 
underdevelopment of a property is so severe that it constitutes blight. 
In December 2009, nine days after the Goldstein decision was handed 
down,161 the Appellate Division rejected an ESDC condemnation 
proceeding in Kaur.162 In Kaur, Columbia University—a private 
university—was seeking to expand its campus in West Harlem using 
eminent domain.163  In 2001, Columbia began working with the New York 
City Economic Development Corporation (EDC) to redevelop the 
Manhattanville area.164  The project itself, which is projected to cost $6.28 
billion, is to be funded entirely by Columbia.165 
In 2006, the ESDC hired Allen, King, Rosen & Fleming (AKRF), a 
consulting firm that evaluated the physical conditions of the project site and 
concluded that the project site was “substantially unsafe, unsanitary, 
substandard, and deteriorated.”166  Because of the potential conflict of 
interest associated with AKRF being retained by both Columbia and the 
ESDC, the ESDC hired Earth Tech, Inc. in 2008 to evaluate AKRF’s 
 
 156. Kaskel v. Impelletteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953). 
 157. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 173. 
 158. Id. (quoting Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 659). 
 159. Id. at 171. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 164. 
 162. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, No. 
125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 163. Id. at 11-15. 
 164. Id. at 12. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 13. 
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study.167  Earth Tech found that a majority of the buildings had 
“substandard and deteriorated conditions.”168  After a public hearing, the 
ESDC determined that the project qualified as a Land Use Improvement 
Project and a Civic Project pursuant to the New York State Urban 
Development Corporation Act.169  Subsequently, several property owners 
in West Harlem brought suit challenging the blight determination.170 
Although the Appellate Division rejected the contention that economic 
underutilization should be used to determine blight,171 Judge Tom wrote a 
dissenting opinion that relied heavily on the rationale of the Goldstein 
majority, the case that the Court of Appeals based its later decision on 
when Kaur came up on appeal.172  He found the term “substandard or 
insanitary area” not to be unconstitutionally vague, contrary to the 
majority’s assertion.173  He emphasized that deference should have been 
given to the ESDC’s decision, stating that “[p]etitioners present merely ‘a 
difference of opinion’ with the conclusions to be drawn from this evidence, 
in which event the courts are bound to defer to the agency.”174  By 
referencing Goldstein,175 the dissent highlights the noticeably absent 
discussion of that decision in the majority’s opinion.176  Kaur,177 as a result, 
was likely to, and ultimately did, face heavy scrutiny by the Court of 
Appeals.178 
Six months later, the Court of Appeals resolved the apparent conflict 
regarding the state’s eminent domain power by reversing the Appellate 
 
 167. Id. at 14.  Although the Appellate Division frames Earth Tech’s study to be a review 
of AKRF’s study, the Court of Appeals takes the position that Earth Tech “conducted its 
own independent research and gathered separate data and photographs of the area before 
arriving at its own conclusions.” Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No 125, 2010 N.Y. 
LEXIS 1181, at *25 (June 24, 2010). 
 168. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 14. 
 169. Id. at 15. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 23. 
 172. Id. at 33 (Tom, J., dissenting); see also infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 173. Id. at 33 (Tom, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 34. 
 175. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 176. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 34 (Tom, J., dissenting).  Although it is not known why 
Judge Catterson did not spend much time addressing Goldstein in the majority opinion, it 
may have been because the rationale of the case would lead to a different conclusion in 
Kaur, or because the majority did not agree with the conclusion in Goldstein and felt it was 
inapplicable to Kaur because of factual distinctions. 
 177. 892 N.Y.S.2d 8. 
 178. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 
24, 2010). 
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Division’s decision.179  Relying primarily on its decision in Goldstein, the 
Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erroneously substituted 
its judgment for that of the ESDC’s where there was no evidence of bad 
faith on the part of the ESDC, the taking was not pretextual, the project was 
a civic project, and respondents’ due process claims were meritless.180 
2. The Problem with Using Economic Underutilization Alone to 
Determine Blight 
One of the major problems with states’ definitions of blight is that they 
are so broad that they could apply to practically every neighborhood in the 
country.181  State statutes are filled with vague and general terms making a 
finding of blight “little more than a procedural hurdle” for redevelopment 
agencies.182  An example of a problematic definition of blight is a statute 
defining a property that exhibits an obstacle to “sound growth” as 
blighted.183  The vague nature of the term “sound growth” allows almost 
any obstacle to economic development to be framed as blight.184  There are 
also factors that are out of a property owner’s control that agencies may 
consider to determine if a property is blighted such as a structure’s age and 
diverse ownership of the property or area.185  All of this points to the 
conclusion that blight condemnations could be used to circumvent bans on 
economic development takings.186  As a result, politicians and developers 
can easily mold any neighborhood to fit within the definition of blight in 
order to suit their needs. 
Although the New York Court of Appeals held that the city officials 
were justified in determining that the area was substandard and subject to 
slum clearance in Kaskel,187 it admitted there could be a case in which “the 
physical conditions of an area might be such that it would be irrational and 
baseless to call it substandard or insanitary, in which case it is probable that 
the conditions for the exercise of the power would not be present.”188  
Although the Court of Appeals ruled that the Columbus Circle area could 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *19-39. 
 181. George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic 
Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School 
Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 47 (2008). 
 182. Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 302. 
 183. See Somin, supra note 92, at 2122. 
 184. See id. at 2124. 
 185. Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 311. 
 186. See Ely, supra note 113, at 136. 
 187. Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953). 
 188. Id. at 662. 
PIPER_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:56 PM 
1172 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
be included in the redevelopment, it left open the possibility that the good 
physical condition of a particular area or piece of property might permit a 
court to reject the finding of a redevelopment agency.189 
Judge Van Voorhis wrote a powerful dissent in Kaskel that seriously 
called the administrative officials’ decision to deem the Columbus Circle 
area blighted into question.190  He criticized the report’s finding that some 
buildings were “substandard and insanitary” because they were old law 
tenements, despite being well-maintained.”191  He also rejected the idea 
that a slum clearance project is merely incidental to the redevelopment of 
other property.192  Therefore, if property that is not a slum is included in the 
project merely for the sake of its own redevelopment, the statutory power 
to condemn fails.193  He believed that there was “possible evasion of this 
law upon a large scale” if the existence of a few slum buildings was enough 
to insulate the agency’s decision to condemn the entire area.194 
One of the New York cases with the most conflicting language both in 
support of and against wide agency discretion in condemnation decisions is 
Yonkers.195  While recognizing that eliminating economic 
underdevelopment and stagnation could be a “public purpose,” the Court of 
Appeals also stated that if the land was not substandard and there was a 
private benefit involved, the public purpose had to be “dominant.”196  
Additionally, while recognizing that the law gives agencies wide discretion 
to decide what constitutes blight, the court emphasized that the facts 
supporting the determination of blight should be spelled out.197  It is the 
court’s role to determine whether there is a “public purpose,” not that of the 
agency.198  Because of the conflicting language in Yonkers, the decision is 
drawn on by both supporters of judicial deference to agencies and 
supporters of meaningful judicial review of agencies’ blight 
determinations.199 
 
 189. Id. at 663. 
 190. See id. (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 665. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 666. 
 194. Id. at 665. 
 195. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975). 
 196. Id. at 330-31. 
 197. Id. at 332. 
 198. Id. at 333. 
 199. See, e.g., Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 
(June 24, 2010) (citing Yonkers in support of judicial deference to legislative agencies); 
Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (citing Yonkers both 
in the majority opinion in support of judicial deference, and in the dissenting opinion in 
support of meaningful judicial review of agencies); Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 
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C. Societal Effects of Blight Condemnations Based on Economic 
Underutilization 
1. Does the Political Majority Know What’s Best? 
In order to gain support for their cause, advocates of broad eminent 
domain powers made the argument that urban decline is occurring and the 
only solution to the problem is to exercise eminent domain.200  When the 
use of blight findings became popular as a way to promote urban renewal, 
advocates contrasted the current physical state of the property with a more 
modern picture of what the city would look like after the property was put 
to a better use.201  In areas a layperson would not necessarily consider a 
“slum,” within the common sense meaning of the word, the prevention of 
future urban decay was used as the justification for urban renewal.202  
However, eventually courts adopted a looser definition of blight to cover 
areas that were not viewed as traditional “slums.” 
Today, blight determinations are used to address the economic concerns 
of the political majority.203  Politicians have become concerned with 
underutilized properties failing to provide the highest possible tax revenue 
to the community and view condemnation as a way to increase tax 
revenues in the long run.204  In fact, one of the justifications the ESDC used 
to find the property in question blighted in Kaur was that the estimated tax 
revenues during construction would be $112 million for the state and $87 
million for New York City.205  As a result of the state delegating its 
condemnation power to governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, 
 
494 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986) (citing Yonkers in support of judicial deference to legislative 
agencies); Syracuse Univ. v. Project Orange Servs. Corp., 897 N.Y.S.2d 335 (App. Div. 
2010) (citing Yonkers in support of courts deciding whether a property is used for the public 
benefit); Sunrise Props. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. 
1994) (stating that as long as the public purpose is dominant, the fact that a private party 
will benefit does not invalidate the condemnation). 
 200. See Pritchett, supra note 53, at 1. 
 201. Id. at 3. 
 202. For example, in Berman v. Parker: 
It was believed that the piecemeal approach, the removal of individual structures 
that were offensive, would be only a palliative.  The entire area needed 
redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region, 
including not only new homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and 
shopping centers.  In this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area 
could be controlled and the birth of future slums prevented. 
348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954). 
 203. See Pritchett, supra note 53, at 18. 
 204. See id. at 21. 
 205. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *17 (June 
24, 2010). 
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some of the agencies are largely insulated from political accountability.206  
Quasi-governmental agencies that can use the power of eminent domain 
without being held directly politically accountable include authorities such 
as airport authorities, highway commissions, community development 
agencies, and utility companies.207  There is a growing concern regarding 
to whom quasi-governmental agencies are accountable and whether the 
public interest is being protected over private interests.208  The ESDC in 
particular has been criticized for its “deplorable lack of transparency.”209  
Allowing unelected officials to condemn private property seemingly 
permits them to decide for the entire community what the “best” use of the 
land is without actually having to consult that community.  Because 
citizens affected by condemnation cannot resort to the political process for 
help, the only avenue left is judicial redress.210  Unfortunately, the courts 
usually defer to agency decisions,211 producing a cyclical effect in which 
there is no accountability.  As Judge Smith states in his dissent in 
Goldstein, “[t]o let the agency itself determine when the public use 
requirement is satisfied is to make the agency a judge in its own cause.”212 
2. Government and Private Developers Working Together to 
Redistribute Property 
One of the problems with blight findings based on economic 
underutilization is that the resulting condemnation prevents the market 
from determining how property is distributed.213  Instead, “blight has 
become the primary vehicle by which municipalities and private developers 
can redistribute property.”214  Because many state legislatures enacted bans 
on economic development takings in response to Kelo, blight findings are 
 
 206. Pritchett, supra note 53, at 5. 
 207. Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/ 
pih/centers/sac/eminent/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). 
 208. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: 
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2008). 
 209. Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., No. 114631/09, 
2010 WL 936220, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2010). 
 210. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 63, 117 (2009). 
 211. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 212. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (2009) (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
 213. See Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 307-08. 
 214. Id. at 306. 
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now being utilized as a tool to circumvent these bans.215  According to Ilya 
Somin, many of the reform laws passed in response to Kelo are ineffective 
because the laws continue to allow takings justified by the eradication of 
blight.216  Since blight is so broadly defined, the states are able to continue 
allowing economic development takings, using blight as a mask.217  
Economic development condemnations are essentially let in through the 
back door by allowing factors such as underdevelopment and stagnation to 
contribute to the determination that an area is blighted.218 
Consultants who conduct blight studies are given wide discretion to find 
blight when an area does not meet economic standards for the city or 
municipality—just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, “blight . . . is 
evidently in the eye of the consultant.”219  Therefore, government agencies 
simply hire consultants who are willing to find blight where the agencies 
want it found.220  This makes it even easier for the government to put land 
to use in the way that it deems “best,” regardless of the interests of the 
current property owners. 
Today, the trend of government entities partnering with private 
redevelopers continues.221  This raises the concern that undemocratic 
practices such as “influence peddling, cronyism and corruption” contribute 
to the use of eminent domain for politically influential redevelopers to be 
awarded lucrative contracts.222  By awarding contracts to politically 
powerful redevelopers, politicians can expect to receive substantial 
campaign contributions, which in turn help such condemnation-friendly 
politicians get re-elected.223  William J. Stern, who worked as chairman and 
chief executive of New York State’s Urban Development Corporation 
(UDC),224 expressed the view that “[u]sing eminent domain for private 
development gives the private sector the opportunity to wield public 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Somin, supra note 92, at 2114. 
 217. See id. at 2124. 
 218. See Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 312. 
 219. Id. at 310. 
 220. Id. at 307. 
 221. Eagle, supra note 210, at 64. 
 222. William J. Stern, The Truth About Times Square, PERSPECTIVES ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN ABUSE, Apr. 2009, at 1, 4, available at https://www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=2676&Itemid=249. 
 223. Eagle, supra note 210, at 116. 
 224. The Urban Development Corporation is now known as the Empire State 
Development Corporation. See History of Empire State Development, NEW YORK STATE’S 
EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT, http://esd.ny.gov/aboutus/history.html (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010). 
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power—which is more or less for sale—in order to benefit privately.”225  
Instead of letting the market decide which developers are awarded 
contracts, lenient eminent domain laws allow developers with greater 
political influence to win contracts regardless of whether they are the most 
qualified.226 
3. Effects on Poor and Minority Populations 
Communities targeted by private developers and city governments are 
largely composed of ethnic and racial minorities.227  The New York 
metropolitan area is no exception.228  According to a study conducted by 
the Institute for Justice, eminent domain abuse in the New York 
metropolitan area disproportionally affects ethnic and racial minorities as 
well as those with lower incomes and lower levels of education.229 
Allowing economic underutilization to be a factor in determining blight 
perpetuates this problem.  As previously stated, blight is a vague term that 
can be used by the politically powerful to separate desirable and 
undesirable land uses.230  When economic underutilization is used as a 
factor in determining blight, it penalizes the poor for failing to use their 
property in the way the government views most favorable.  If property 
owners cannot afford to implement features found in newer structures, their 
properties may be considered blighted.231  This leaves some people with a 
higher risk of being subject to condemnation simply because they cannot 
afford to maintain their property in the most desirable way.  Because the 
poor and minority groups often have the least political power, they often 
have scarce resources with which to defend themselves from powerful 
actors who control the process.232  Just as economic development takings 
 
 225. Stern, supra note 222. 
 226. Id. at 6. 
 227. DICK M. CARPENTER & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUSTICE, VICTIMIZING THE 
VULNERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 1 (2007), available at http:// 
www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/Victimizing_the_Vulnerable.pdf. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.  Of the eleven locations in metropolitan New York that were studied, minorities 
accounted for 92% of residents, compared to a countywide 57%; median incomes were 
$21,323.32, compared to a countywide average of $29,880.25; 28% of the residents were 
impoverished, compared to 17% countywide; 40% of residents did not have high school 
diplomas, compared to 24% countywide; and the percentage of residents that rented was 
87%, compared to 62% countywide. Id. 
 230. Pritchett, supra note 53, at 18. 
 231. Lefcoe, supra note 181, at 62. 
 232. CARPENTER & ROSS, supra note 227, at 2.  City agencies and private developers are 
encouraged to team up together against local property owners. See BUILDING EMPIRES, 
DESTROYING HOMES, supra note 45, at 3. 
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“guarantee[] that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor 
communities,”233 blight findings based on economic underutilization 
produce the same result. 
4. Is Eminent Domain Efficient? 
Supporters of a broad eminent domain power argue that it increases 
efficiency because without it, private developers cannot easily assemble 
pieces of land necessary for large beneficial projects.234  They argue that by 
allowing the government to condemn necessary properties, hold-outs and 
high transaction costs are avoided.235  Hold-outs occur when a landowner 
refuses to sell until she is offered a higher price because she knows a 
developer is interested in starting a project for which her land is 
necessary.236  However, Steven Eagle argues that condemnations actually 
lead to secondary rent-seeking.237  Secondary rent-seeking is an inefficient 
result that occurs when redevelopers and businesses compete for a share of 
the increased value of the property that has been condemned.238  What is 
gained by avoiding hold-outs is often lost by secondary rent-seeking.239 
Additionally, the partnerships between developers and members of local 
government may cause further inefficiencies.240  As previously stated, these 
partnerships may cause an official to choose a redeveloper because of a 
personal relationship rather than the merits of his or her plan.241  
Alternatively, they could lead to harmful bidding contests between 
redevelopers that leave businesses “unwilling to bribe out of 
consideration.”242  Additionally, providing subsidies to businesses reduces 
the opportunities for other possibly more efficient businesses from coming 
to an area.243  Generally, the market is better suited to adapt to changing 
conditions than the government, which has largely been unsuccessful in 
predicting technological and business trends.244 
Outside pressures, such as extensive litigation over whether the 
government has the right to condemn the property, often hamper and delay 
 
 233. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 234. Eagle, supra note 210, at 79. 
 235. Id. at 80. 
 236. See id. at 81-82. 
 237. Id. at 82. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. at 84. 
 241. Id.; see also supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. 
 242. Eagle, supra note 210, at 90. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id. at 92. 
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redevelopment projects for years.245  The risk of condemnation can also act 
as a disincentive for potential property owners to invest in their property.  
Also, people who feel there is a chance the government will take their 
property will be less likely to invest time and resources into a starting a 
business.246  This results in “condemnation blight,”247 which actually leads 
to reduced economic development, thus defeating the purpose of the 
condemnation.248 
D. Kaur: How Two New York State Courts Could Come to 
Drastically Different Conclusions 
1. The Appellate Division’s Decision 
In Kaur, several Manhattanville property owners contested the blight 
determination made by the ESDC.249  The Appellate Division severely 
criticized the blight study upon which the ESDC relied in making its 
condemnation determination.250  To begin with, the blight study was not 
conducted until after Columbia had gained control of most of the 
properties.251  A previous study conducted by the ESDC in 2002 did not 
find any blight and recognized that West Harlem had great potential for 
development if it were re-zoned.252  By the time AKRF conducted the 
blight study, Columbia had previously gained control of the very buildings 
being evaluated and had since let them fall into disrepair.253  To make 
matters worse, the Appellate Division found that the ESDC instructed 
AKRF to use a methodology that was biased in Columbia’s favor.254  The 
study produced by AKRF found that forty-eight of the sixty-seven lots in 
 
 245. See id. at 94. 
 246. See id. at 102. 
 247. Condemnation blight is defined as “[t]he reduction in value that the property 
targeted for condemnation suffers in anticipation of the taking.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
332 (9th ed. 2009). 
 248. Eagle, supra note 210, at 102. 
 249. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 
No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 250. Id. at 21-22. 
 251. Id. at 21. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id.  There was evidence that Columbia vacated 50% of tenants in seventeen 
buildings, left water infiltration problems unaddressed, left building code violations open, 
and let its tenants use the premises in violation of the local codes. Id. 
 254. Id.  Specifically, AKRF was told to “highlight” blight conditions found and prepare 
individual building reports “focusing on characteristics that demonstrate blight conditions.” 
Id. 
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the project area had at least one substandard condition.255  Such conditions 
included “poor or critical physical lot conditions, a vacancy rate of 25 
percent or more, or site utilization of 60 percent or less.”256  The Appellate 
Division discredited the evidence used to support the blight findings, 
pointing out that such evidence could be found in virtually every 
neighborhood in New York City.257 
Although the ESDC eventually replaced AKRF with Earth Tech due to 
conflicts of interest,258 Earth Tech used the same flawed methodology to 
review AKRF’s report.259  Earth Tech’s review of the study found that 
some buildings had deteriorated further since AKRF’s study and that thirty-
seven out of sixty-seven lots were in “critical or poor condition.”260  Earth 
Tech found extensive building code violations and concluded that the 
buildings had not been well maintained.261  Earth Tech attributed these 
problems to “long-standing lack of investor interest in the 
neighborhood.”262  The Appellate Division found that the ESDC did not 
show evidence of any significant health or safety issues other than minor 
building code violations.263  The court emphasized that the ESDC’s study 
should have included factors that the petitioners included in their “no blight 
study,” such as real estate values, rental demand, rezoning applications, 
prior proposals for the development of the waterfront, and new commercial 
ventures.264 
Next, the Appellate Division explicitly rejected eminent domain takings 
based solely on underutilization.265  AKRF and Earth Tech attempted to 
find blight based on the underutilization of the properties, relying on the 
floor area ratio (FAR) of the properties.266  A low FAR indicates that a 
 
 255. Id. at 13. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 22. 
 258. In Tuck-It-Away Associates v. Empire State Development Corp., several businesses 
in the West Harlem area requested documents relating to the proposed condemnation 
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).  The Appellate Division found that the 
documents should be disclosed because AKRF’s representation of both Columbia and the 
ESDC “creates an inseparable conflict for purposes of FOIL.” 54 A.D.3d 154, 164 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2008). 
 259. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
 260. Id. at 14. 
 261. See id.  Specifically, there were “410 open violations” that spanned three-quarters of 
the project site as of July 2006. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 22. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 23 (“The time has come to categorically reject eminent domain takings solely 
based on underutilization.”). 
 266. According to the New York City Department of City Planning: 
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property owner is not fully utilizing its development rights due to lack of 
demand.267  The problem with using FAR to determine blight in 
Manhattanville is that the maximum FAR is two, which essentially allows 
owners to construct either a one- or two-story structure.268  Although the 
New York City Department of City Planning uses a 50% standard to 
identify “underbuilt” lots, the ESDC used an arbitrary standard of 60%, 
without any justification for the figure.269  A 60% standard essentially 
forces owners to build the maximum two-story structure in order for their 
properties not to be considered “underbuilt.”270  The court viewed the 60% 
figure as unreasonable and instead decided that a 40% FAR would be 
acceptable to classify a building as underutilized in the Manhattanville 
area.271 
Ultimately, the court held that blight findings based on underutilization 
transform “the purpose of blight removal from the elimination of harmful 
social and economic conditions in a specific area to a policy affirmatively 
requiring the ultimate commercial development of all property regardless 
of the character of the community subject to such urban renewal.”272  It 
noted that blight findings predominantly based on underutilization have 
only been upheld in conjunction with other factors such as zoning defects 
or insufficiently sized or configured lots.273  The court also concluded that 
because the redevelopment had been centered around Columbia’s needs 
from the beginning, Columbia was the private beneficiary of the project—
 
The floor area ratio (FAR) is the principal bulk regulation controlling the size of 
buildings. FAR is the ratio of total building floor area to the area of its zoning lot. 
Each zoning district has an FAR control which, when multiplied by the lot area of 
the zoning lot, produces the maximum amount of floor area allowable in a 
building on the zoning lot. For example, on a 10,000 square-foot zoning lot in a 
district with a maximum FAR of 1.0, the floor area of a building cannot exceed 
10,000 square feet. 
NYC Zoning Glossary, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ 
zone/glossary.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). 
 267. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id.  The court reasoned that the M-1, M-2, and M-3 zoning of the Manhattanville 
industrial area was intended for uses in which a one-story structure would be preferable. Id.  
Additionally, “for uses requiring loading docks, or storage of trucks or heavy equipment, or 
gas stations, for example, full lot coverage is not desirable.” Id.  Using a 40% FAR instead 
of a 60% FAR would result in a decrease from 39% to 20% of properties being 
characterized as “underutilized” in the project area. Id. at 22-23. 
 272. Id. at 23. 
 273. Id. 
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the project itself was not a public purpose.274  Collectively, these factors led 
the Appellate Division to conclude that the condemnation of the area in 
Manhattanville was unconstitutional under both the United States and New 
York State Constitutions.275 
2. Reversed by the New York Court of Appeals 
Relying on its Goldstein decision from the prior year, the New York 
Court of Appeals flatly rejected the Appellate Division’s analysis in 
Kaur.276  To begin, the court emphasized that “[i]t is only where there is no 
room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, 
that judges may substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the 
public purpose of blight removal has been made out for that of the 
legislatively designated agencies.”277  Because the ESDC’s decision was 
not “irrational or baseless,” the Court of Appeals ruled that the Appellate 
Division erred by substituting its own opinion for the ESDC’s.278  The 
Court found that the ESDC considered “a wide range of factors including 
the physical, economic, engineering and environmental conditions at the 
Project site,” and based its decision on the “conditions as a whole.”279  
Because the Court of Appeals did not find any defects in the ESDC’s blight 
study, the court found that the Appellate Division had substituted its view 
impermissibly.280 
The Court of Appeals was also quick to dismiss the respondents’ 
argument that the ESDC acted in “bad faith” or that the taking was 
pretextual.281  The court stated that although Columbia had previously 
hired AKRF to prepare its environmental impact statement (EIS), the 
record did not substantiate any claim of a conflict of interest.282  With 
regard to the Appellate Division’s criticism of the methodology used by the 
second consulting firm, Earth Tech, the court found that Earth Tech 
“conducted its own independent research and gathered separate data and 
 
 274. The Appellate Division noted that in Kelo the plurality assumed that the 
redevelopment itself was a public purpose.  This could not be assumed in the present case.  
Id. at 20. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See generally Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 
1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 277. Id. at *21 (citing Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 
(N.Y. 2009)). 
 278. Id. at *22-24. 
 279. Id. at *23. 
 280. Id. at *22-24. 
 281. See id. at *24-25. 
 282. See id. at *24. 
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photographs of the area before arriving at its own conclusions.”283  
Essentially, in two short paragraphs the Court of Appeals dismissed any 
claim that the ESDC had acted in bad faith or that the taking was 
pretextual.284 
Next, the Court of Appeals found the statutory term “substandard or 
insanitary” to be constitutional.285  It emphasized that “‘[m]any factors and 
interrelationships of factors may be significant’ for a blight finding,”286 and 
because of this, agency determinations that a property is blighted or 
“substandard or insanitary” must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.287  
Because blight “is an elastic concept that does not call for an inflexible, 
one-size-fits-all definition,” the court held that the statutory term 
“substandard and insanitary” was not unconstitutionally vague.288 
Finally, the Court of Appeals chastised the Appellate Division for 
finding that there was no evidence of blight prior to Columbia’s acquiring 
the majority of the properties.289  It stated that the Appellate Division 
ignored the “Urbitran blight study,” commenced in 2003 by the EDC, 
which provided evidence that the area was blighted prior to Columbia’s 
acquisition.290  Without going into detail, the court stated that the Urbitran 
study “unequivocally concluded that there was ample evidence of 
deterioration of the building stock in the study area and that substandard 
and unsanitary conditions were detected in the area.”291  Earth Tech 
provided additional support for the claim that the area was previously 
blighted by finding that “the neighborhood has suffered from a long-
standing lack of investment interest.”292 
Judge Smith, who dissented in the prior Goldstein decision,293 wrote a 
concurring opinion stating that although the finding of blight seemed 
 
 283. Id. at *24-25. 
 284. See id. 
 285. Id. at *25-27. 
 286. Id. at *26 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 483 
(1975)). 
 287. Id. at *27. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See id. at *27. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at *28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 292. See id. 
 293. Judge Smith raised several significant points in his dissent in Goldstein.  While 
recognizing that cases such as Yonkers expanded the definition of “public use,” he noted 
that this did not mean that a state agency could condemn property and hand it over to a 
private developer simply to turn it into a better neighborhood.  He believed that New York’s 
definition of blight invited officials to use blight as a pretext for transferring property from 
less-favored to more-favored owners and that officials accepted this invitation routinely.  In 
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“strained and pretextual,” it was “no more so than the comparable finding 
in Goldstein.”294  Judge Smith reluctantly stated, “[a]ccepting Goldstein as 
I must, I agree in substance” with the majority’s opinion.295 
After the decision, Nicholas Sprayregen, one of the owners of Tuck-It-
Away, Inc.,296 vowed to appeal the decision—his petition for certiori is 
currently pending before the United States Supreme Court.297 
III.  NEW YORK MUST LIMIT THE EXTENT TO WHICH ECONOMIC 
UNDERUTILIZATION CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE BLIGHT 
New York’s legislature and judiciary must work together to limit blight 
determinations based on economic underutilization.  Since Kaur was 
reversed by the Court of Appeals, it seems that legislative reform is the 
 
a sense, Judge Smith stated explicitly what everyone else was thinking: it was clear that the 
elimination of blight was never the purpose of the Atlantic Yards redevelopment.  Only part 
of the area, the Vanderbilt rail and subway hub, could fairly be described as blighted; the 
rest of the area was arguably characterized as blighted to pave the way for the stadium. See 
generally Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 186-90 (N.Y. 2009) 
(Smith, J., dissenting). 
 294. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *39 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 295. Id.  Judge Smith did not accept Section VI of the Kaur opinion because he felt that 
once the Court “decided that the removal of urban blight provides a sufficient constitutional 
basis for the taking, and that the project is a ‘land use improvement project’ within the 
meaning of the UDC Act, there is no reason to consider UDC’s alternative argument that the 
taking may also be justified as one for a ‘civic project.’” Id. 
 296. Tuck-It-Away, Inc., a self-storage company, was one of the businesses set to be 
condemned in the case. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *2. 
 297. See Karen Freifeld, Columbia Expansion Backed by New York’s Top Court, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 24, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-
24/columbia-expansion-backed-by-new-york-s-top-court.html.  Sprayregen’s petition asks 
the Supreme Court to address two questions: 
1. Whether it was error for the Court of Appeals of New York to disregard the 
principles enunciated in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)[,] in 
sanctioning the use of eminent domain for the benefit of a private developer, when 
the circumstances presented by the instant case exemplify the very bad faith, 
pretext, and favoritism that this Court warned could result if Kelo’s safeguards 
were ignored? 
2. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States imposes any minimum procedural standards, in 
accordance with the requirement of fundamental fairness, to preserve a property 
owner’s meaningful opportunity to be heard within the context of an eminent 
domain taking? 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tuck-it-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., __ 
U.S. ___ (Sept. 21, 2010) (No. 10-402).  Since the Supreme Court is asked to review more 
than 700,000 petitions each year, the likelihood that the Supreme Court will grant petitioner 
a writ of certiori is slim. See U.S. Supreme Court Procedures, United States Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/EducationalResources/ConstitutionResources/SeparationOfPowers
/USSupremeCourtProcedures.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
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only remaining avenue to limit blight findings based on economic 
underutilization.  New legislation that gives a meaningful definition to 
blight will give judges the ability to scrutinize blight findings more 
substantively. 
A. Kaur . . . Worse Than Goldstein? 
1. The Columbia Project Exhibits “Impermissible Favoritism”298 
Toward Columbia and Provides Only Incidental Public Benefits 
The New York Court of Appeals should not have held that the Columbia 
project was constitutional because the project lacks a “public use” as 
required by both the United States and New York Constitutions.  The 
Appellate Division distinguished Kaur from Kelo on the grounds that the 
Columbia redevelopment was not, in and of itself, a public purpose.299  
However, the Court of Appeals ignored this argument and, in actuality, 
ignored Kelo altogether, failing to even mention the controlling Supreme 
Court precedent on eminent domain.300  Instead of considering whether 
there was a public use, the Court of Appeals simply stated that removal of 
urban blight was a public purpose and that the records of the project site 
supported the ESDC’s determination.301  Apparently, the Court of Appeals 
forgot that “transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored 
private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are 
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”302 
By refusing to review the ESDC’s decision, the court ignored troubling 
issues, such as evidence that Manhattanville was not in a depressed 
economic condition.303  The 2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated that 
West Harlem was in a period of economic rejuvenation and that its great 
potential for increased economic development could easily be 
accomplished through rezoning.304  Without specifically addressing the 
2002 West Harlem Master Plan, the Court of Appeals rejected the 
Appellate Division’s argument by citing a 2004 Urbitran blight study that 
found “substandard and unsanitary conditions were detected in the area.”305  
 
 298. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 299. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19-20 (App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 300. See Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *1-39. 
 301. Id. at *20-24. 
 302. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 303. See Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *20-24; Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 19. 
 304. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
 305. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *27-28.  The Court of Appeals did not elaborate 
on the Urbitran study findings, except to note that the study found several buildings to be 
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However, the legitimacy of the 2004 Urbitran blight study was questioned 
in petitioner’s brief.306  Urbitran allegedly used a biased methodology to 
find the Manhattanville area blighted and failed to produce any individual 
building reports or offer any evidence of interior inspection of any of the 
buildings.307  After an eleven page draft was composed without any 
individual building reports, the Urbitran Study was abandoned without 
explanation.308 
Instead of considering a variety of plans to redevelop Manhattanville, 
the expansion of the Columbia campus was the only plan seriously 
considered by the ESDC.309  Although the Court of Appeals stated that nine 
different plans were evaluated in 2007, it nevertheless admits that by as 
early as July 30, 2004, the ESDC had entered into an agreement with 
Columbia, “which provided that Columbia would pay ESDC’s costs 
associated with the Project.”310  Nothing in the Court of Appeals’ opinion 
refutes the assertion that the blight designation was entirely pretextual in 
order to justify the use of eminent domain for a “massive capital project” 
for Columbia.311 
 
dilapidated and numerous buildings to have poor exterior conditions and structural 
degradation. Id. at *5-6.  Urbitran defined dilapidated as “significant evidence of aesthetic 
degradation (usually a combination of broken windows, peeling paint, and façade damage, 
among other things).” Id. at *5 n.4. 
 306. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. 
LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/30951605/Spray-
Reg-En-Brief. 
 307. For example, Urbitran used “inappropriate criteria such as lack of light and air, 
traditionally associated with densely populated tenement neighborhoods,” as blighting 
factors. Id. at 48.  Urbitran also found seven residential buildings to be “incompatible uses” 
without “actual evidence of any actual impairment of either residential or commercial or 
industrial uses.” Id. at 48-49.  It also counted “site conditions” separately from “building 
conditions” to inflate the number of allegedly blighted properties. Id. at 49.  This method 
allowed for “a building in otherwise perfect condition [to] be rated as blighted for 
something as slight as a crack in the sidewalk and one broken exterior light fixture.” Id.  
Finally, Urbitran found thirteen properties to be in poor condition while the allegedly biased 
ARKF study rated these same thirteen properties as “fair.” Id. at 49-50. 
 308. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *19-20. 
 309. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 
No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010).  The only alternative plan considered was 
West Harlem Community Board 9’s 197-a plan. See id.  This plan called for diversified 
development in the Manhattanville industrial area to maximize economic benefits for local 
residents. See id.  It called for Columbia to play a role in the redevelopment but rejected the 
idea that Columbia would use eminent domain to achieve its goals. See id.  There was no 
mention of the 197-a plan until 2007, well after plans for Columbia to redevelop the area 
were under way. See id.  The ESDC rejected the 197-a plan on the basis that it “d[id] not 
meet Columbia’s needs as Columbia had defined them.” Id. 
 310. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *6. 
 311. See id. at *1-39; see also Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (noting that “this project has 
always primarily concerned a massive capital project for Columbia”). 
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Thus, the sole beneficiary of the project will be Columbia,312 whereas 
the beneficiaries of the Goldstein project will be the public—who can use 
the stadium—and the people that occupy the commercial and residential 
spaces.313  With the exception of the public swimming facilities and several 
other improvements that the ESDC claims will benefit the public,314 the 
beneficiaries of the proposed Columbia project are by and large limited to 
Columbia’s employees and students.315  Although the project plans to 
create “14,000 jobs during the construction of the new campus as well as 
6,000 permanent jobs following the [p]roject’s completion,”316 little 
evidence was presented in support of the contention that it was necessary 
that the properties in question be condemned in order to achieve such 
results.317  Furthermore, it is likely that these claims are inflated, since the 
ESDC is not “legally required to actually produce the economic gains that 
supposedly justified the condemnation in the first place.”318 
Despite any purported public benefits, it is clear that any such benefits 
are incidental to the improvement of Columbia’s facilities.  Condemnation 
is impermissible if any “clearance that may be involved is merely 
incidental to the redevelopment of other types of real property.”319  The 
argument that a private university conveys “public benefits” sufficient to 
justify the use of condemnation is flawed.320  By and large, universities 
provide “private goods” that are “fully captured by their students and 
faculty.”321  There is no need for the government to subsidize the benefits 
 
 312. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 24. 
 313. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y. 2009). 
 314. The project plans to create “approximately 94,000 square feet of accessible open 
space and maintained as such in perpetuity that will be punctuated by trees, open vistas, 
paths, landscaping and street furniture and an additional well-lit 28,000 square feet of space 
of widened sidewalks that will invite east-west pedestrian traffic.” Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 
1181, at *17.  It also provides for infrastructure improvements to the 125th Street subway 
station and maintenance of the West Harlem Piers Park. Id. at *18.  Finally, Columbia has 
agreed to “open its facilities—including its libraries and computer centers—to students 
attending a new public school that Columbia is supplying the land to rent-free for 49 years.” 
Id. 
 315. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20. 
 316. Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *17 
 317. See Ilya Somin, New York High Court Upholds Columbia University Takings, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2010, 5:44 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/24/new-york-
high-court-upholds-columbia-university-takings/. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 665 (N.Y. 1953) (Van Voorhis, J., 
dissenting). 
 320. See Todd Zywicki, Universities, Public Use, and Eminent Domain, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 5, 2006, 6:25 PM), http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2006_06_04-
2006_06_10.shtml#1149365300. 
 321. Id. 
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students receive from going to college.322  Two arguably “public benefits” 
that private universities provide are scientific research and education for 
the underprivileged.323  Both of these “public benefits,” however, are 
already “heavily subsidized by the government through a wide variety of 
programs.”324  Condemnation, which usually provides aesthetic and 
lifestyle-related benefits, is rarely used to advance research or educate poor 
students.325  Furthermore, “[e]ducation and research can be conducted in a 
wide variety of locations and thus are not vulnerable to the ‘holdout’ 
problems usually cited as a justification for condemning property.”326  
Whereas the general population has the opportunity to buy a ticket to see a 
New Jersey Nets game, rent an apartment, or purchase commercial space, 
Columbia chooses the employees it hires and the students it accepts.  The 
population that truly has an opportunity to benefit from the proposed 
Columbia project is a much smaller subset of the general public than the 
population that has an opportunity to take advantage of the stadium and 
residential and commercial space in the Atlantic Yards project. 
The ESDC’s treatment of the Columbia project is what Justice Kennedy 
would characterize as “impermissible favoritism.”327  In his concurring 
opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy addressed improper motives behind 
property transfers to private parties that have only pretextual public 
benefits.328  He argued that courts should strike down those takings where 
it is clearly shown that the taking was intended to favor a particular party 
and the benefits to the public are incidental.329  In Kelo, both the private 
parties and the government were aware of New London’s depressed 
economic condition and need for economic rejuvenation.330  In Kaur, the 
purpose of eradicating blight was not even mentioned until years after the 
project was initiated.331  This blatant showing of “impermissible 
favoritism” clearly warrants a “presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of 
invalidity” under the Public Use Clause.332  In sum, the Columbia project is 
 
 322. See id. 
 323. See id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. See id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490-93 (2005) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 491. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 16 (App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 332. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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the quintessential example of a case “in which the transfers are so 
suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported 
benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an 
impermissible private purpose.”333  The stark differences between the 
redevelopment in Kelo and Kaur should have been sufficient to render the 
Columbia project unconstitutional.334  However, in its reversal of the 
Appellate Division’s decision, the Court of Appeals failed even to mention 
Kelo,335 which is arguably the leading Supreme Court case on eminent 
domain.  In addition, the Court of Appeals did not provide evidence that the 
taking was not pretextual; instead, it dodged the issue stating that claims of 
pretext were “unsubstantiated by the record.”336 
2. The Failure to Address the Issue of Economic Underutilization 
Undercuts the Decision 
To the extent that it matters, the lacking evidence of actual physical 
blight renders Kaur factually distinct from the 2009 Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Goldstein.337  The property to be redeveloped in the Columbia 
project was not blighted to the extent that a majority of the property was in 
the Atlantic Yards redevelopment.338  The Goldstein case involved the 
question of whether land that itself was arguably not blighted, but is 
adjacent to land that was indisputably blighted, could be included in the 
redevelopment.339  In Kaur, however, there was a dispute as to whether any 
of the property to be condemned for the Columbia Project was blighted.340  
In Goldstein, the Court of Appeals was able to rely on a Berman argument: 
what the legislature thought should be included in the project should not be 
questioned as long as there is a “public purpose.”341  Because the Atlantic 
Yards were already undisputedly established as blighted, the Court of 
Appeals had little difficulty in deferring to the ESDC’s determination of 
 
 333. Id. 
 334. Compare id., with Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12. 
 335. See Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 
(June 24, 2010). 
 336. Id. at *25. 
 337. Compare id. at *1, with Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 
(N.Y. 2009). 
 338. See discussion supra Part II.D.  In Goldstein, there was no dispute regarding 
whether more than half of the project area was blighted. See 921 N.E.2d at 166.  This 
blighted area has been designated the Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area (ATURA) 
since 1968. See id. 
 339. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 164. 
 340. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 
No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
 341. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
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what land was necessary to achieve the public purpose of eradicating 
blight.342  In contrast, the public purpose of eradicating blight was not 
established prior to the ESDC partnering with Columbia to redevelop the 
area according to Columbia’s needs.343 
The Court of Appeals found “all that is at issue is a reasonable 
difference in opinion as to whether the area in question is in fact 
substandard and insanitary,”344 despite the fact that the majority of the 
evidence that the ESDC used to substantiate its blight finding was based on 
the underutilization of property.345  The physical evidence the ESDC found 
consisted primarily of building code violations,346 most of which were 
found in buildings that Columbia previously purchased and failed to 
properly maintain.347  The factors considered to contribute to blight 
included conditions that a majority of New York City neighborhoods 
exhibit.348  The Appellate Division pointed out that “[e]ven a cursory 
examination of the study reveals the idiocy of considering things like 
unpainted block walls or loose awning supports as evidence of a blighted 
neighborhood.”349  Conversely, the Court of Appeals, relying on Earth 
Tech’s apparently flawless study, found evidence of blight.350  However, 
the study makes no mention of the identity of the owners of these 
properties, notably failing to refute the Appellate Division’s claim that 
Columbia owned the blighted properties.351 
Not only did the Court of Appeals fail to confirm the Appellate Court’s 
opinion that “[t]he time has come to categorically reject eminent domain 
 
 342. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166. 
 343. The EDSC met with Columbia and EDC for the first time in March 2004 to discuss 
the proposed condemnation, five months before the study conducted by Urbitran was issued. 
See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *6 (June 24, 
2010). 
 344. Id. at *23 (citing Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 173). 
 345. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23. 
 346. See id. at 14. 
 347. See id. at 21. 
 348. See id. at 22. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *12-13 
(June 24, 2010).  The Court of Appeals’ opinion states that Earth Tech “noted certain 
variables including current land uses, structural conditions, health and safety issues, 
utilization rates, environmental contamination, building code violations and crime 
statistics.” Id.  Earth Tech also apparently found “extensive building code violations in the 
area” and “chronic problems that the buildings had with water infiltration.”  It also found 
“deteriorated facades,” “widespread vermin on the streets and graffiti on the walls of the 
buildings and other structures.” Id. at *13. 
 351. Compare id. at *12-13, with Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
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takings solely based on underutilization,”352 it also failed to address 
economic underutilization at any point in its opinion.353  Although the 
Court of Appeals stated that factors such as “economic underdevelopment 
and stagnation” could be used to determine blight in Goldstein, it did not 
go as far as ruling that strictly economic development takings were 
permissible.354  Instead of addressing the issue of whether economic 
development takings are permissible, the Court of Appeals chose to hide 
behind its limited review of blight findings in eminent domain proceedings.  
In doing so, it blindly accepted the ESDC’s contention that there was actual 
evidence of physical blight, as ludicrous as the purported evidence was. 
B. Legislative Changes are Necessary to Help Prevent Future 
Eminent Domain Abuse 
Since the Court of Appeals refused to limit the definition of blight in 
Kaur,355 legislative changes are necessary to help curb eminent domain 
abuse.  New York is one of the few states that did not pass legislation 
limiting economic development takings in response to the Kelo decision in 
2005.356  As a result, there is no legislative basis for preventing courts from 
recognizing economic development as a public purpose.  In order to 
provide greater protection of private property rights, common law 
protections must be supplemented by legislation.357  Although New York 
courts are free to interpret the New York Constitution as affording broader 
 
 352. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 23. 
 353. See Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181, at *1-39. 
 354. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009).  While 
unhappy with the majority opinion, Judge Smith notes in his dissent that the “good news 
from today’s decision is that our Court has not followed the lead of the United States 
Supreme Court in rendering the “public use” restriction on the Eminent Domain Clause 
virtually meaningless.” Id. at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 355. See generally Kaur, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181. 
 356. In fact, New York is only one of seven states that failed to pass any legislation 
restricting eminent domain in the wake of Kelo.  For an up-to-date list of legislation enacted 
in response to Kelo, see Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510&Itemid
=107 (last visited Aug. 19, 2010). 
 357. After Kelo was decided, the Institute for Justice released a white paper urging states 
to take legislative action in order to prevent the “floodgates” of eminent domain abuse from 
opening.  The white paper suggested ways to design an effective law to protect citizens from 
losing their land for the benefit of private parties. See INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, KELO V. CITY 
OF NEW LONDON: WHAT IT MEANS AND THE NEED FOR REAL EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM 
(2005), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/Kelo-White_Paper.pdf. 
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protection to individual rights and liberties than the federal Constitution,358 
legislative reform would provide more consistent protection to property 
owners from eminent domain abuse. 
Many states that have passed legislative reform in response to Kelo 
failed to close loopholes allowing economic development takings through 
broad exemptions for blight condemnations.359  This essentially negates 
any prohibition on economic development takings because using economic 
underutilization as evidence of blight renders the blight requirement 
useless.360  Although passing legislation prohibiting economic development 
takings is a start, New York needs to go further by restricting the definition 
of blight.  In order to do so, New York must define blight in a meaningful 
way.361  A satisfactory example of a restricted definition is one that limits 
blight to factors such as property with the presence of buildings unfit for 
human habitation, fire hazards, safety hazards, defective or unusual titles, 
structures with utilities unfit for their intended use, vacant land with 
overgrowth or trash accumulation, a property that is a public or attractive 
nuisance, a property with health or safety code violations, tax delinquencies 
exceeding the value of the property, and environmental contamination.362 
New York may also want to set a minimum threshold for the amount of 
property that must be blighted before non-blighted property is subject to 
eminent domain.363  Minor building code violations that can be easily 
remedied should not suffice to designate a property as blighted.  This is 
especially true in the Columbia project because Columbia itself was 
responsible for failing to keep the properties it had previously purchased up 
to building code standards.364  Columbia should not have been permitted to 
 
 358. See, e.g., Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1193-94 (N.Y. 1979); Sharrock v. Dell 
Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Perri, 423 N.Y.S.2d 
674, 677-78 (App. Div. 1980). 
 359. See Somin, supra note 92, at 2120-22.  Ten states have passed laws banning 
economic development but have left blight exemptions intact by broadly defining blight as 
any obstacle to “sound growth” or an “economic or social liability.” Id. 
 360. See id. at 2121. 
 361. Currently, New York courts are guided by Yonkers Community Development Agency 
v. Morris, which lists factors that may determine blight such as “irregularity of the plots, 
inadequacy of the streets, diversity of land ownership making assemblage of property 
difficult, incompatibility of the existing mixture of residential and industrial property, 
overcrowding, the incidence of crime, lack of sanitation, the drain an area makes on 
municipal services, fire hazards, traffic congestion, and pollution.” 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 
(N.Y. 1975). 
 362. ALA. CODE 24-2-2(c) (2010). 
 363. Lowenstein, supra note 12, at 320 (suggesting that either two-thirds or three-
quarters of the property should be blighted before other property is condemned alongside it). 
 364. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21 (App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, No. 125, 2010 N.Y. LEXIS 1181 (June 24, 2010). 
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benefit from its unwillingness to perform simple repairs on the buildings it 
owned.  Setting more tangible standards for condemnations can help curb 
eminent domain abuse and the seemingly endless litigation that stems from 
it. 
New York may also want to consider adopting heightened procedural 
requirements for blight determinations.  Some states have put significant 
procedural burdens on the government entity attempting to condemn a 
property for the stated purpose of eliminating  blight.365  For example, in 
Colorado, an agency is required to show clear and convincing evidence that 
the taking is necessary to eliminate  blight.366  A procedural burden like the 
one in Colorado could force New York state agencies to condemn 
properties only where the eradication of blight is the true purpose of the 
taking. 
Motivated by the Appellate Division’s 2009 Kaur decision, in February 
2010, New York State Senator Bill Perkins introduced a bill designed to 
define blighted properties and areas more specifically.367  The bill proposes 
to amend section 103 of the EDPL to define “blighted property,” “slum,” 
“substandard and insanitary property,” “unfit for human habitation,” and 
“abandoned property.”368  It adds a new section to the EDPL—section 204-
a—that provides conditions upon which a single property can be declared 
blighted, including, but not limited to: (1) dilapidated or deteriorated; (2) 
abandoned property; (3) environmentally contaminated property; (4) a 
public nuisance; (5) an unsafe structure; (6) vacant property; (7) defective 
or unusual conditions of title; (8) tax delinquencies that exceed the value of 
the property; and (9) property used for persistent criminal activity.369  
Multiple properties and project areas may be declared blighted if “seventy-
five percent of the individual parcels in the area are declared blighted.”370  
The Urban Development Corporation Act (UDCA) will still include the 
language that recognizes there are blighted properties that  “impair or arrest 
the sound growth of an area.”371  However, the UDCA will be amended to 
 
 365. See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization In The Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 657, 674-75 (2007). 
 366. Id. at 675-76.  Other takings are conditioned on satisfying a lower standard—
preponderance of the evidence—that the taking is necessary. Id. 
 367. S.B. 6791 and A.B. 10811, 2010 Leg., 233rd Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2010). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id.  Each condition provides more specific qualifications in the bill.  For example, 
property that is “environmentally contaminated” must require “remediation for current or 
future use under state or federal law, if the owner fails to remedy the problem within six 
months of receiving notice of violation from the appropriate governing body.” Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
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define “blighted property” and “blighted area” as “property that is declared 
blighted under section 204-a” of the EDPL.372  Under the revised UDCA, 
“substandard and insanitary” will be defined as property that is “declared 
blighted under section 204-a” of the EDPL.373  Another notable change is 
that the UDCA will require the corporation to offer “substantially 
comparable housing accommodations to displaced residents in projects that 
include a residential component, and insofar as is feasible, the corporation 
shall offer substantially comparable industrial or commercial 
accommodations to displaced businesses in projects that include an 
industrial or commercial component.”374  As of April 21, 2010, the bill had 
been referred to the judiciary.375  If the bill or a similar future bill passes, 
there will be significantly greater protection against eminent domain abuse 
for property owners. 
C. Supporting Stricter Judicial Scrutiny of Blight Determinations 
The projects that are included under the umbrella of blight eradication 
demonstrate the need for stronger judicial review of agencies’ blight 
determinations in New York.  Even in states that made statutory changes, 
“anti-Kelo backlash has not turned out to be a complete substitute for 
strong judicial enforcement of public use limits on eminent domain.”376  A 
stronger judicial role could help alleviate the problem of unelected agencies 
that are insulated from political accountability.377  If the judiciary does not 
act as a check on legislative agencies’ findings, who will?  The elected 
officials who appoint agency personnel do not have an incentive to oversee 
the agencies’ findings because the officials are often the ones benefitting 
from the partnerships with private developers through campaign support 
and/or campaign contributions.378  Meaningful judicial scrutiny of agency 
determinations and findings will help eliminate some of the cronyism and 
unfair partnerships between local government and private developers.379  If 
agencies know they will no longer be able to team up with developers 
freely to facilitate private-to-private transfers, there will be less incentive to 
engage in this type of behavior.  Surely meaningful judicial scrutiny of 
 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. (emphasis added). 
 375. Id. 
 376. Somin, supra note 92, at 2170-71; see also supra notes 216-18 and accompanying 
text. 
 377. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text. 
 379. See Stern, supra note 222. 
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agency determinations will not completely eliminate partnerships between 
the government and private developers, but it may make these parties think 
twice about the land they are proposing to condemn and whether there is 
truly a valid public purpose behind the project. 
Part of engaging in a meaningful review of the agency’s determination 
involves conducting a detailed review of the facts supporting the 
determination that a property is blighted.  Some argue that judges are not 
competent to review the facts of an agency’s determination because they 
are not eminent domain experts, and instead the agency is in the best 
position to know whether the condemnation will benefit the community.380  
It has always been the role of the judiciary, however, to weigh in on 
whether a constitutional right has been violated.381  The protection of a 
constitutional right, particularly the right not to have private property 
unjustly taken by the government, must be a priority over deference to a 
quasi-legislative state agency.  New York courts cannot continue to affirm 
virtually every condemnation action, even if some degree of deference is 
owed to the legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
New York must limit the extent to which economic underutilization can 
be used as evidence of blight.  Despite the reversal of the Appellate 
Division’s Kaur decision, the people of New York should advocate for 
legislative reform of eminent domain.  Clearly, New York courts have 
expressed their refusal to interfere with the ESDC’s decisions, regardless of 
how nonsensical the evidence that supports the decisions may be.  Even in 
an eminent domain-friendly state such as New York, blight findings based 
solely on economic underutilization should be categorically rejected to help 
prevent eminent domain abuse in blight condemnations.  In order to curb 
eminent domain abuse, the legislature should enact legislation that 
explicitly prohibits economic development takings and blight 
determinations based solely on economic underutilization.  For added 
protection against eminent domain abuse, New York courts need to support 
 
 380. See Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 436 (N.Y. 1986) (“[I]t 
is not the role of the courts to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among 
alternatives.”). 
 381. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009) 
(Smith J., dissenting) (“It is hard to imagine any court saying that a decision about whether 
an utterance is constitutionally protected speech, or whether a search was unreasonable, or 
whether a school district has been guilty of racial discrimination, is not primarily a judicial 
exercise.”). 
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the legislation by exercising more meaningful judicial scrutiny of agencies’ 
blight determinations. 
